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Abstract  
Rhetorical constraints have the potential to inhibit a successful 
communication transaction. How they do that sometimes practically 
remains unclear, especially within the study of rhetoric in the African 
context. This paper examines Kwame Nkrumah’s rhetorical urgency 
as an argumentative tool for the establishment of an organization 
which would direct the political, economic and military directions of 
Africa.  Employing Bitzer’s Situation (1968) and Meyer’s Composite 
Audience (1999) as analytical framework, the paper takes a critical 
look at Nkrumah’s rhetorical invention to locate the inherent 
constraints and how they (constraints) eclipsed the total success of 
Nkrumah’s invention. This study therefore has implications for the 
episteme of the different contexts within which rhetorical inventions 
are created and performed within the pan African liberation sphere. 
 
Keywords: Nkrumah, rhetoric, OAU, pan Africanism, colonialism 
 
 
Introduction 
The conceptualisation, formation and birth of the Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) were arguably through the rhetorical invention 
of Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah within a complex political context. The 
OAU was formed on the 25th of May 1963 at a Conference of 
Independent African Heads of State at Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. On 
the eve of the formation of the OAU, Kwame Nkrumah gave a speech 
at this conference. This speech is the central concern of this paper. 
Winding the clock back between the period of 1958 and 1961, three 
meetings of the new African leaders were held to discuss the 
establishment of a Union of the newly independent African nations. 
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Kwame Nkrumah, on the eve of Ghana’s independence on the 6th of 
March 1957, had declared that Ghana’s independence was 
meaningless until there was a total decolonisation of the rest of Africa. 
A year later in 1958, he called for the first ever meeting to discuss 
issues on African unity and to develop new strategies for the 
decolonization of the rest of the dependent African territories. By this 
time, Ghana had become the first black Sub-Saharan African territory 
to gain her independence. This became refreshing news for blacks both 
within the continent and in the diaspora.  
The first conference was held in Accra. It was attended by the 
heads of the eight newly independent African States from 15th to 22nd 
April, 1958. It was an important conference since it marked the first 
ever meeting of black African leaders after their countries had gained 
independence from western colonial rule.  In the same year, the Ghana, 
Guinea, Mali Union was formed (Rooney, 2007). This was a hopeful 
sign of the possibility of Nkrumah’s greatest agenda: the political 
union of Africa. The success of the Accra conference sent positive 
signals of hope to the rest of the African countries still struggling under 
colonial rule (Rooney, 2007). The Accra Conference was followed by 
the 1960 Addis Ababa Conference. It was attended by nine 
independent heads of State. This conference carried further the initial 
agenda which was discussed at the 1958 conference but failed to 
embrace Nkrumah’s rhetoric of African political union. At the end of 
the ten-day meeting, Nkrumah’s key agenda, the political unification 
of independent African countries was deferred for consideration at the 
next conference which was scheduled two years after the Addis Ababa 
conference. It was agreed among the new African leaders that during 
the next meeting, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) should be 
formed. Earlier on in 1961, a conference had been held in Casablanca, 
Morocco which had been attended by Ghana, Morocco, United Arab 
Republic, Guinea and Mali. Using the Casablanca platform, Nkrumah 
continued to press for African political unity.  
I posit that the support given to Nkrumah’s ideas at the 
Casablanca conference was, perhaps, the greatest support Nkrumah 
ever received in Africa in his quest for a continental political union. 
David Rooney (2007) argues that “no other conference of African 
powers during Nkrumah’s lifetime was to give so much support to 
African Union” (p. 290). Since the Ghana, Guinea, Mali Union had 
been formed three years prior to the Casablanca meeting, Nkrumah 
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enjoyed great support from these West African countries which were 
duly represented by their leaders at the conference. However, the 
positive signal which Nkrumah received in Casablanca was going to 
be put into a crucible during the 1963 OAU meeting in Addis Ababa. 
Addis Ababa conference was attended by more than thirty independent 
countries in Africa. This was more than three times the number of 
attendants of any previous meetings of independent African leaders. It 
was going to be the biggest platform for Nkrumah’s rhetoric on 
Africa’s political unity.  
For a proper discussion of this study, I ask these pertinent 
questions: What constituted the essence of Nkrumah’s Addis Ababa 
invention? What was the object of the speech? Did it find space within 
the uncertain rhetorical discourse of African unity?  Did the speech 
address the composite audience and what was their response? I 
contend that the success of Nkrumah’s invention at Addis Ababa was 
largely hindered by major constraints within the rhetorical situation 
(Bitzer, 1968). These constraints were born out of political 
developments which occurred before the conference. Nkrumah’s 
failure to adequately address these constraints before and at Addis 
Ababa allowed them to finally eclipse the effectiveness of his 
rhetorical invention. 
I intend, therefore, to do a number of things in this paper. First, 
I will examine Nkrumah’s rhetorical arguments in his 1963 Addis 
Ababa speech. In so doing, I will look at his application of fear and 
urgency as rhetorical tools; secondly, I will look at the argument of 
including the parts in the whole (Perelman & Olbrects –Tyteca, 1969), 
within his invention.  In the second part of this paper, I will attempt to 
look at the composite audience and Nkrumah’s strategy in addressing 
them. In the last section, I will examine the key constraints which 
confronted Nkrumah’s invention within the rhetorical situation. I will 
conclude with responses of Nkrumah’s audience and the overall 
effect(s) of his OAU speech. 
The 1964 Addis Ababa address, I argue, marks a climactic 
point of Nkrumah’s rhetoric on African unity. It forms a key part of 
Nkrumah’s political rhetorical tradition which spans nearly two 
decades. A rhetorical analysis of the Addis Ababa speech will, 
perhaps, not be complete if it is not perceived within the larger context 
of Nkrumah’s invention on African political unity. Salazar (2002), in 
his African Athens, is right when he remarks that a speech never comes 
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alone. This assertion is corroborated by Warnick (1996), who further 
indicates that “discourse never occurs in a vacuum; it occurs in a 
situation comprised of other text [and that] rhetors construct text with 
other text in mind” (p. 191). Nkrumah’s rhetoric of continental unity 
emerged on the international scene from 1957 and had gained 
significant momentum after a period of six year in Addis Ababa. For 
the audience at Addis Ababa, they had become, in the words of Myers 
(1999), “a continuous audience” (p. 55) of Nkrumah. They were aware 
that African political unity had for some time become part of 
Nkrumah’s rhetorical commonplace. The major challenge for 
Nkrumah was how to appeal to an audience with the same message 
albeit with the purpose of causing their adherence, as the entire African 
leaders on the continent were at the deliberative point of deciding on 
the fate or the possibility of a continental unity. I discuss Nkrumah’s 
invention by first, looking at how he employed fear and urgency in his 
speech. 
 
The Sense of Urgency and Creation of Fear 
As part of the opening remarks, Nkrumah sets out in a tone of urgency 
which tends to arouse a sense of fear within the audience. If the speech 
were to be music, it could have passed for an allegro.  This kind of 
tempo sets the appropriate mood for the main focus of the speech. The 
sense of urgency is going to underlie the central message in the 
address.  Nkrumah begins, “[o]ur objective is African Union now. 
There is no time to waste. We must unite now or perish.” At this 
beginning point, Nkrumah establishes a central issue in his invention: 
the need to act quickly as a result of the looming danger. The essence 
of persuasion, notes Perelman (1982), is to “incite action” (p. 12) in 
order to bring about change. But the change which is needed by 
Nkrumah involves a sense of urgency. The sense of fear created by the 
opening words of the speech, further invokes a feeling of imminent 
destruction amongst the audience which serves as a catalyst for urgent 
action. At this moment, fear and urgency turn to reinforce each other 
in the audience. In the Book Two of his Rhetoric, Aristotle (2007) 
defines fear as: 
 
a sort of pain and agitation derived from the 
imagination of a future destructive or painful evil 
… only what has the potential for great pains or 
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destruction, and these only if they do not appear far 
off but near, so that they are about to happen; for 
what is far off is not feared (p. [1382a]). 
 
Looking at the on-going discussion, two things are to be noted from 
Aristotle’s (2007) definition of fear. The first is the “potential” of the 
danger causing “destruction”; second, when the supposed danger 
seems imminent.  
Nkrumah further goes on to narrate how the momentum in the 
fight for independence on the continent has resulted in a dramatic swell 
of the number of independent states from eight to thirty-one within a 
period of five years. He therefore acknowledged this positive change 
in fortune by praises as he described it as an “open testimony to the 
indomitable and irresistible surge of our people’s quest for 
independence.” In an epidictic posture, Nkrumah extols the admirable 
virtues of Africans in the fight for independence. It is a way by which 
Nkrumah informed the audience that each of the individuals 
constituting the immediate audience of the speech, had in some way, 
made substantial sacrifices beyond their personal interest for their 
countries. This is part of what Aristotle (2007) refers to as 
“honourable” (75-78).  
In extolling the noble deeds of his audience, Nkrumah is quick 
to note his unique contribution and pioneering role in the freedom 
movement in Africa. He remarked, “[at] the first gathering of African 
Heads of State, to which I had the honour of playing host, there were 
representatives of eight independent State (sic) only.” Though the 
audience are not ignorant of Nkrumah’s efforts towards liberation 
movements in Africa, the reminder perhaps increases his ethos and 
places him in a unique position which gives him deliberative 
legitimacy to be able to show the way for the future direction of 
Africa’s liberation. If there was the need to highlight the honourable 
deeds and unique contributions of freedom fighters in Africa, then 
Nkrumah reserved for himself a double honour. He had been the first 
African to bring the newly independent countries to deliberate on 
continental unity in Accra. Nkrumah had written his name in memory 
as a doyen of Pan-Africanism by the late 1950’s. Thus, from the onset 
of his speech, Nkrumah asserted his authority and ethos as a leader 
who understood the rudiments of African liberation struggle and 
possessed the knowledge needed to overcome the trappings of neo- 
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colonialism in Africa. The noble deeds of Africans which Nkrumah 
extolled had been characterised by the “revolutionary speed” of the 
freedom fighters which had brought about freedom to the millions of 
people in Africa. This same “speed” is what is needed in Africa to in 
order to shape the future. He remarked: 
 
In the task which is before us of unifying our 
continent we must fall in with that pace or be left 
behind. The task cannot be attacked in the tempo 
of any other age than our own. To stall behind the 
unprecedented momentum of actions and events in 
our time will be to court failure and our own 
undoing. 
 
According to Perelman (1969), “the values eulogiz[ed] by the speaker 
must be ones deemed worthy of guiding our action for otherwise” (p. 
52). Nkrumah brought to the deliberation table two basic propositions, 
which were that either we maintained the “tempo” by working to unite 
ourselves or we slowed down and ended up in failure. By doing this, 
the speech thus provides the audience with only two deliberative 
options. In other words, the “debate is limited to the thesis that has 
been offered” (Perelman, 1969, p. 239). He created a presence in the 
minds of his audience which would be reinforced many times in the 
course of the address. The success of the “tempo” or “momentum” 
which Nkrumah delineated is quite significant in terms of its practical 
effects. In the year 1960, three years preceding Nkrumah’s address at 
Addis Ababa, as many as seventeen dependent African countries 
became free from colonial rule. Guinea became independent in 1958, 
a year after Ghana’s; between 1961 and 1963 six more countries also 
became independent.  
Thus, a steady momentum had been maintained which 
produced indubitably, the fruits of independence. In a logical sense, if 
a method had produced concrete results, then it needs replicating it, 
knowing its efficacy as a sure means of achieving the end results. Since 
choices are based upon the “end”, the deliberative speaker should not 
be ignorant of it (Aristotle, 2007, p. 49 [1358b]). Nkrumah thus 
showed a way to unity to justify the end.  
What is the reason for Nkrumah’s urgency? What stimulates 
it? The urgency is the need to “lay the foundation” of a union 
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government “here and now.” This is because the agents of colonialism 
pose a major threat to African countries after independence. Nkrumah 
asserted: 
 
On this continent it has not taken us long to 
discover that the struggle against colonialism does 
not end with the attainment of national 
independence. Independence is only the prelude to 
a new and more involved struggle for the right to 
conduct our own economic and social affairs, to 
construct our society according to our aspirations, 
unhampered by crushing and humiliating neo-
colonialist controls and interference. 
 
Nkrumah created a presence (Perelman, 1979, p. 17) before the 
audience by revealing in concrete terms colonialism which had 
metamorphosed into a more hideous form, neo-colonialism. This new 
form of colonialism, according to Nkrumah, is “a new and a more 
involved struggled” which requires the old zeal, a tool that was 
employed for the attainment of independence in Africa. Nkrumah set 
the stage therefore for a paradigm shift, that is, from momentum for 
the attainment of independence from colonialism to momentum for 
African unity against neo - colonialism. In other words, nationalists 
movements in their separate African countries fought for their 
independence, but with the “new and a more involved struggle” 
against neo-colonialism, Africans need to unite our forces. By 
highlighting the new form of colonialism and the strategy needed, 
Nkrumah “draw[s] the attention of the audience to them and thereby 
gives them a presence that prevents them from being neglected” 
(Perelman, 1982, p. 35). Up to this point in the speech, there is a 
conscious repetition of an imperative which appears in a correlative 
structure to achieve forceful effect.  
 
[w]e must unite now or perish.   
  We must fall into that pace or be left behind. 
We must unite or sink. 
 
These imperatives, in each case, accentuate in a similar fashion the two 
options given by the speaker which rhetorically limit the audience in 
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their deliberative choice. In fact, the audience can only choose the 
good, that is, Nkrumah’s desire for Africa’s political unity which holds 
the key to the continent’s economic development. On the other hand, 
they can choose the bad. This option presents a picture of Africa being 
left behind to be destroyed by the agents of neo-colonialism as a result 
of disunity. 
The ominous schemes of the colonialists are brought closer to 
the audience through direct and indirect references. He described how 
Africans “have been threatened with frustration where rapid change is 
imperative and with instability where sustained effort and ordered rule 
are indispensable.” The sense of “frustration” and “instability” 
witnessed in Africa reminds the audience of examples of neo-colonial 
influence in places such as the Congo and Algeria which, as individual 
countries, could not stand the might of colonialism thereby 
capitulating under such circumstances. A direct rhetorical example to 
deepen the argument is the speech’s reference to the situation in South 
America: 
 
We have already reached the stage where we must 
unite or sink into that condition which has made 
Latin-America the unwilling and distressed prey of 
imperialism after one-and-a-half centuries of 
political independence. 
 
Words such as “perish,” “prey,” “threatened,” “ruthless,” and 
“dangerous” create a picture of a formidable opponent ready to hunt 
down Africa. The words together present the danger of the forces of 
neo-colonialism. To Perelman (1979):  
 
things present, things near to us in space and time, 
act directly on our sensibility. The orator’s 
endeavors often consist, however, in bringing to 
mind things that are not immediately present…to 
make “things future and remote appear as present 
(p. 17). 
 
Since the supposed enemy, neo-colonialism, seems stronger in might 
and its tactics appear daunting enough for any single African territory, 
it becomes not only imperative for Africans to unite but a matter of 
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survival which needs all the urgency it deserves. The creation of 
presence by Nkrumah calls for the immediate action of African leaders 
to act “by crushing and humiliating neo-colonialist controls and 
interference” in Africa.    
In view of this clear and present danger that neo-colonialists 
pose to Africa’s political and economic freedom, the speech prescribes 
a continuous “tempo” in action. That is, African freedom fighters 
should move in a similar pace just as before to politically unite the 
continent in order to successfully combat the agents of neo-
colonialism. Invoking fear through the creating of presence, becomes 
a necessary catalyst for action. 
 
African Unity: Inclusion of the Parts within the Whole 
Nkrumah’s proclamation on the need for Africa’s unity which he made 
on Ghana’s Independence Day was to become his mantra, a rhetorical 
commonplace, within his liberation discourse of Africa. At Addis 
Ababa in 1963, African unity was his watchword. The deliberative 
spotlight was thrown on the continent without any emphasis on 
individual states within Africa. He noted: 
 
But just as we understood that the shaping of our 
national destinies required of each of us our 
political independence and bent all our strength to 
this attainment, so we must recognise that our 
economic independence resides in our African 
union and requires the same concentration upon the 
political achievement.  
 
Nkrumah drew from the quasi logical argument of inclusion of the 
parts in the whole. According to Perelman and Olbrects -Tyteca 
(1969), “the whole is treated as similar to each one of its parts” (p. 
231). They further explain that “what is true of the whole is true of the 
part” (p. 231). Nkrumah projected the argument from the species to 
the genus. By so doing, he literally threw his audience into the bigger 
argument to enable them perceive the extent of the African problem in 
view of the imminent threat of neo-colonialism to Africa. In effect, he 
filled the deliberative space with the bigger African problem (genus), 
in whose solution laid the ultimate salvation of separate African 
territories (species). Nkrumah continued: 
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The social and economic development of Africa 
will come only within the political kingdom, not 
the other way round.  
 
Africa, as a continent, becomes the focal point of discussion in the 
speech, not the limited interests of the individual states. The 
suppression of the challenges facing individual states in the speech 
allows a projection of the whole in the minds of the audience, thus 
allowing the parts to remain only at the background. For when the 
whole becomes weak, the parts cannot stand on their own. This 
direction of the argumentation remodels what the audience must 
regard as most important. By this argument, Nkrumah succeeded in 
bringing Africa to the fore. He pointed to some remarkable examples 
of the ‘whole’: 
 
The United States of America, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, were the political decisions of 
revolutionary peoples before they became mighty 
realities of social power and material wealth.   
 
These rhetorical examples are appropriate for Nkrumah’s invention. 
By analogy, they fit into the exact frame of Nkrumah’s vision for 
Africa. The examples tend to serve two important purposes. Firstly, by 
logically projecting the whole over its parts implies that any supposed 
prosperity of a single African territory cannot be fully realised or 
complete without the prosperity of the bigger whole, in this case, 
Africa. Secondly, through the unity of the parts, the strength of the 
whole is maximised.  
In the speech, the argument of the ‘parts within the whole’ is 
not only applied to the African situation but to the neo-colonialists as 
well. Nkrumah further revealed the complex schemes of the neo-
colonialists which worked perfectly to achieve a singular purpose. He 
noted, “we would be deceiving ourselves in the most cruel way were 
we to regard their individual actions as separate and unrelated.” He 
reminded the audience of the old schemes of the neo-colonialist by 
tapping into the long tradition of colonial exploitation in Africa which 
is shared by the audience. Murphy (1997) posits that “rhetorical 
traditions organise the ‘social knowledge' of communities and make 
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available symbolic resources for the invention of arguments aimed at 
authoritative public judgments” (p. 72). Thus, with the seemingly 
united actions of neo-colonialists, Nkrumah gave more credence to 
African unity in the face of the continent’s search for economic 
development and security to mitigate the subtle Western neo-colonial 
influences. Africa needs to become ‘whole’ in order to become 
economically and militarily powerful, instead of remaining poor and 
weak in its separate ‘parts.’   
Unity, in view of Nkrumah's arguments, does not become an 
option, but a crucial necessity. Thus, Africans cannot fail to unite if 
the agents of neo-colonialism are united in their singular purpose. In a 
series of rhetorical questions, Nkrumah rhetorically defended his 
deliberative proposition of Africa’s unity in his effort to cause 
adherence to his thesis by the audience:  
 
Do we have any other weapon against this design 
but our unity? Is not our unity essential to guard 
our own freedom as well as to win freedom for our 
oppressed brothers, the Freedom Fighters? Is it not 
unity alone that can weld us into an effective force, 
capable of creating our own progress and Making 
our valuable contribution to world, peace? Which 
independent African State, which of you here will 
claim that its financial structure and banking 
institutions are fully harnessed to its national 
development? Which will claim that its material 
resources and human energies are available for its 
own national aspirations? Which will disclaim 
substantial measure of disappointment and 
disillusionment in its agricultural and urban 
development? 
 
With these six rhetorical questions, the forcefulness of Nkrumah’s 
position becomes apparent. In the face of the ‘presence’ which he had 
created, he reiterated in a rhetorical manner the absence of a better 
choice aside his thesis on African unity. In a sense, Nkrumah had 
argued and concluded that the thesis which he had presented for the 
audience’s assent is the best deliberative choice they could ever make 
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in view of the given situation. Perelman and Olbrects –Tyteca (1969) 
note: 
 
 This appeal, known classically as the argumentum 
ad ignorantiam, derives it force essentially from its 
very urgency, for it excludes the possibility of 
pausing for thought: the debate is limited to the 
thesis that has been offered and to what might 
possibly be opposed to it immediately (pp. 238-
239).  
 
Nkrumah had succeeded in creating a sense of urgency which needed 
immediate deliberative answer. Knowing the differing opinions of 
African leaders on African political unity (which will be examined in 
detail in the next section of the discussion), he had forcefully reminded 
them of the real, imminent but hidden dangers Africa faced as more 
countries fought to become free from colonial rule. As a rhetor, he 
exuded what Aristotle (2007) refers to as “practical wisdom” (p. 112) 
as he showed insight into the hidden strategies of the neo-colonialists. 
Nkrumah further reveals startling statistics of the colonialists’ 
exploits: 
 
Our continent is probably the richest in the world 
for minerals and industrial and agricultural primary 
materials. From the Congo alone, Western firms 
exported copper, rubber, cotton, and other goods to 
the value of 2,773 million dollars in the ten years 
between 1945 and 1955, and from South Africa, 
Western gold mining companies have drawn a 
profit, in the six years between 1947 to 1951, of 
814 million dollars. 
 
He reminded the audience of what George Padmore (1953) refers to as 
Africa’s continuous “rape” (p. 17) by the West and the tremendous 
resources which are still available for the economic development of 
the continent. At this point, the speech applies the rhetorical concepts 
of “association and dissociation.” Perelman and Olbrects –Tyteca 
(1969), in defining these terms indicate: 
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By process of association we understand schemes 
which bring separate elements together and allow 
us to establish a unity among them, positively or 
negatively, by means of one another. By processes 
of dissociation, we mean techniques of separation 
which have the purpose of dissociating, separating, 
disuniting elements which are regarded as forming 
a whole or at least a unified group within some 
system of thought (p. 190).  
Nkrumah noted, among other things, that “[o]ur continent certainly 
exceeds all the others in potential hydro-electric power which some 
experts assess as 42 per cent of the world's total.” By the use of the 
pronoun “our” he associated all the resources belonging to the 
individual countries in Africa as a unified whole whilst, at the same 
time, dissociating the rest of the world, “others”, which, for him, 
comprised an entirely separate entity from Africa. Through the means 
of association, he had identified Africans with one another breaking 
the artificial walls of the imperialists which have separated people of 
similar historical and cultural heritage. Nkrumah had presented a vivid 
picture of African unity. The argument further speaks to correct the 
wrong ties which still existed between France and her former colonies 
in Africa. Indirectly, Nkrumah had reiterated the idea that Africa, as a 
single whole, has a natural heritage and destiny entirely separated from 
the rest of the world. Perelman and Olbrects –Tyteca (1969) continue 
to say that, “all association implies dissociation … the two techniques 
are complimentary and are always working at the same time” (p. 190). 
Throughout the speech, Nkrumah constantly chose the first person 
plural, in both the subject “we” and object “our” forms to rhetorically 
associate Africans with one another. The repetition of the pronouns is 
purposely done to achieve a rhetorical effect: that we are one people 
with a common destiny. It is a reminder of the uniqueness of Africans 
and the interconnectedness of their destinies in the realisation of their 
full potential as a people.  
 
Addressing the Composite Audience 
At Addis Ababa, Nkrumah was clearly presented with a composite 
audience. A speaker is confronted with a composite audience when the 
speaker confronted with a heterogeneous audience representing 
different interests (Myers, 1999). This was a major challenge to his 
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invention since there seemed to be differing interests among the 
audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) put it clearly when 
they say: 
 
It often happens that an orator must persuade a 
composite audience, embracing people differing in 
character, loyalties, and functions. To win over the 
different elements in his audience, the orator will 
have to use a multiplicity of arguments (pp. 21-22). 
 
Since the beginning of Nkrumah’s call for African unity, more than a 
decade before the Addis Ababa conference, the new African leaders 
together with other freedom fighters had become a key audience for 
Nkrumah’s rhetoric. The African leaders, in Edwin Black’s terms as 
cited by Myers (1999), formed a “public that is ‘clustered about’ a set 
of defining commonplaces that relate to a subject of discussion” (p. 
57). In other words, they had become an indispensable audience of 
Nkrumah’s rhetorical invention on his African unity project. At Addis 
Ababa, the African leaders formed Nkrumah’s immediate and most 
important audience. If African unity was ever going to become a 
reality, Nkrumah needed to get this crucial section of his audience on 
board because they constituted the delegates who had the mandate to 
vote on the proposal for continental political unity. In sum, the 
delegates, so to speak, formed a rhetorical audience (Bitzer, 1968) for 
Nkrumah’s invention. 
From the Accra conference in 1958, several groups began to 
emerge with differing opinions on African unity. The first category of 
groupings was the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups. The 
Casablanca group comprised Morocco, Ghana, the United Arab 
Republic (Egypt), Guinea and Mali. Whilst the Monrovia group was 
made of Liberia, Togo, Senegal and Nigeria (Rooney, 2007, pp. 90-
91). Nkrumah was the key mouthpiece of the Casablanca group which 
argued for a radical approach to continental unity. The Monrovia 
group, which was led by Nigeria, favoured a moderate view. Their 
view, in essence, expressed a rather gradual approach to African unity.  
The other groupings were those which advocated for regional 
associations in place of continental unity. Two of these major groups 
were the Union Afrique et Malgache (UAM) and the East African 
Federation. The Union Afrique et Malgache (UAM) was an association 
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of former French colonies in Africa with membership of twelve 
countries. The main purpose of the group was to ensure close 
economic and political ties among members and with France. The East 
African Federation was formed by Julius Nyerere, President of 
Tanzania. The other member countries were Kenya and Uganda 
(Thompson, 1969, pp. 329-332). 
Nkrumah was then confronted with these three major power 
blocs with varying interests at Addis Ababa. As a rhetor he needed to 
address them adequately to get them on board. To Perelman and 
Olbrects –Tyteca (1969), “a great orator is one who possesses the art 
of taking into consideration, in his argumentation, the composite 
nature of his audience” (pp. 21-22). The fate of Nkrumah’s rhetoric on 
African unity largely depended on these different African groups 
present at Addis Ababa.  
In terms of deliberative end, the immediate rhetorical audience 
could be narrowed down to two main groups: those who favoured 
continental political unity and those who favoured gradualism through 
regional groupings (Thompson, 1969). It should be noted, however, 
that those who favoured gradualism were not necessarily in favour of 
regional groupings but the two groups stood on one side of the 
argument: Africans are not ready for a political union now. They 
simply were not interested in an immediate political unity of Africa. 
At this point, it became obvious that Nkrumah was seemingly fighting 
from a weaker position in terms of numbers since the other groups (the 
moderate and regional groupings) relatively had the majority of 
African leaders within their fold.  
First, Nkrumah addressed the Monrovia group. He began by noting 
their view, “[i]t has been suggested that our approach to unity should 
be gradual, that it should be piece-meal.” The reference to “gradual” 
and “piecemeal” perhaps, immediately drew the attention of the 
members of the Monrovia group to Nkrumah’s argument as a response 
to their argumentative position. Next, Nkrumah placed the moderate 
position within the whole context of the African problem. He 
continued:  
 
This point of view conceives of Africa as a static 
entity with "frozen" problems which can be 
eliminated one by one and when all have been 
cleared then we can come together and say: ‘Now 
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all is well. Let us now unite.’ This view takes no 
account of the impact of external pressures. Nor 
does it take cognisance of the danger that delay can 
deepen our isolations and exclusiveness; that it can 
enlarge our differences and set us drifting further 
and further apart into the net of neo-colonialism, so 
that our union will become nothing but a fading 
hope, and the great design of Africa's full 
redemption will be lost, perhaps, forever. 
 
Nkrumah ridiculed the position of the group which he considered as 
untenable in the face of the present challenges in Africa. Perelman and 
Olbrechts –Tyteca (1969) observed that, “a statement is ridiculous as 
soon as it conflicts, without justification, with an accepted opinion” (p. 
206). In the earlier part of the address, Nkrumah treated the audience 
with a vivid narration of the complex and evolving nature of Africa’s 
challenges which the audience are perhaps “blind” to in view of their 
professed position on Africa’s unity. Perelman and Olbrechts -Tyteca 
further remark that that “ridicule is the penalty for blindness and is 
apparent only to those for whom this blindness is obvious” (p. 206). 
Through the metaphor of “drifting … into the net of neo-
colonialism” Nkrumah revealed a hidden danger and its consequence 
on Africa if the new leaders were to see the moderate position as the 
solution to the present challenge of neo-colonialism. Nkrumah made 
the moderate position to rhetorically appear weak and rendered it 
ineffective as a means of salvaging Africans from the “net of neo-
colonialism.” 
Immediately after addressing the Monrovia group, Nkrumah 
turned to speak to the section of the audience which fundamentally 
believed in regional integration in place of continental unity. He spoke 
particularly to the French group in West Africa and the East African 
group. He observed, “[t]he view is also expressed that our difficulties 
can be resolved simply by a greater collaboration through co-operative 
association in our inter-territorial relationships.” After reminding the 
audience of the position of the French and Eastern African groups, 
Nkrumah moved on quickly to show the weakness of this deliberative 
position by again invoking the quasi-logical argument of the inclusion 
of the parts into the whole. He remarked that: 
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 This way of looking at our problems denies a 
proper conception of their inter-relationship and 
mutuality. It denies faith in a future for African 
advancement in African independence. It betrays a 
sense of solution only in continued reliance upon 
external sources through bilateral agreements for 
economic and other forms of aid.  
 
In this response, Nkrumah subjected the argument of regional groups 
as being narrow which only looked at the parts without taking into full 
cognizance of the bigger whole. Nkrumah had demonstrated an 
understanding of the bigger problem devoid of temporal solution of 
the challenge of neo-colonialism. For Nkrumah, the solution of the 
African problem was located within a continental solution. For 
purposes of deliberation, he closed the argument of regional groupings 
by pointing to the huge economic potential of the “whole” which will 
be far more than what the “parts” (regional groupings) can attract.  
There is the far more compelling advantage which this 
arrangement offers, in that aid will come from anywhere to a united 
Africa because our bargaining power would become infinitely greater. 
We shall no longer be dependent upon aid from restricted sources.  
With this statement, Nkrumah concluded his address of the 
regional groups and all possible delegates who saw regional groupings 
as the viable option concerning African unity. Nkrumah had made an 
effort in addressing the composite audience. By his invention, he had 
advanced his arguments for African political unity which was 
generally shared by the Casablanca group. For them, Nkrumah’s 
rhetoric of unity was an advancement of the groups’ own position. 
With the two other groups, the moderate and the regional groups, 
Nkrumah had, to some extent, made strides to win them by addressing 
them separately. Myers (1999) observed that, “the speaker does not 
write off any of his significant audiences, but attempts to ingratiate 
himself with all of them” (p. 67). For a moment, the speech seemed to 
have addressed some of the core issues standing in the way of 
continental political unity. This approach seemed rhetorically 
effective. Myers further concludes that “the ability [for a speaker] to 
formulate statements that communicate distinct, and perhaps even 
incompatible, messages simultaneously to diverse audiences is, 
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therefore, crucial to political success” (p. 55). The effectiveness of this 
approach in Addis Ababa is discussed in the last section of this paper. 
After addressing the composite audience, Nkrumah made a 
climactic move as the speech gradually got to the end. He pulled up a 
perfect rhetorical example to bring his argument to that climactic 
point. Nkrumah created an emotional presence by drawing from the 
example of the United States of America which he likened to the 
African situation. By this connection, he enacted in the minds of the 
audience, the historical formation of the United States of America. He 
allowed his audience to see in a flash, a vision of the Africa that he had 
rhetorically envisaged. This moment marked a highpoint in the Addis 
Ababa address. Nkrumah declared: 
 
When the first Congress of the United States met 
many years ago in Philadelphia one of the 
delegates sounded the first chord of unity by 
declaring that they had met in "a state of nature." 
In other words, they were not in Philadelphia as 
Virginians, or Pensylvanians, but simply as 
Americans. This reference to themselves as 
Americans was in those days a new and strange 
experience. May I dare to assert equally on this 
occasion Your Excellencies, that we meet here 
today not as Ghanaians, Guineans, Egyptians, 
Algerians, Moroccans, Malians, Liberians, 
Congolese or Nigerians but as Africans. Africans 
united in our resolve to remain here until we have 
agreed on the basic principles of a new compact of 
unity among ourselves which guarantees for us and 
our future a new arrangement of continental 
government.  
 
The vision created in the speech, in a way hallows Addis Ababa. 
Nkrumah had reminded the delegates of their place within this 
historical epoch in the destiny of Africa. A landmark event akin to 
what happened in Philadelphia. The new vision presented by Nkrumah 
had the potential to cause the audience to re-evaluate their stance. It 
allows them to argue within themselves simultaneously as Nkrumah 
presents his arguments (Perelman & Olbrechts –Tyteca, 1969), 
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awakening in them to see their unique place in the shaping of the 
destiny of a continent in which they are called to become major actors. 
Through Nkrumah’s words, he had renewed the audience from being 
separate parts into forming a single whole so that each member can 
now see himself as part of the other forming a uniquely whole, totally 
independent of their former parts. In effect, Nkrumah was, in a 
rhetorical move, trying to reconstitute the gathering in the minds of the 
audience within the light of what happened in Philadelphia. By so 
doing, he created in the audience for a moment, a new sense of a single 
African community in which all the audience have a new kind of 
citizenship as proud Africans. 
In marking the peroration, Nkrumah made another decisive 
move. He invoked what seemed as the triumphant entry of Jesus into 
Jerusalem in John chapter 12, verses 9 to 11. He declared: 
 
We shall thus begin the triumphant march to the 
kingdom of the African Personality, and to a 
continent of prosperity, and progress, of equality 
and justice and of work and happiness.  
 
Thus, when African unity is achieved, Africans shall reign supreme in 
Africa. This is an expression of a deep hope in the destiny of Africa. It 
will not be the victorious march of an individual hero but a “triumphant 
march” of all the freedom fighters to the kingdom” Nkrumah had 
already envisioned through his rhetoric. The freedom fighters who 
formed Nkrumah’s immediate audience are what Farrell (1993) refers 
to as “the rhetorical audience (the “one who decides”) that functions 
as the efficient cause of the enactment of rhetoric as practical art” (p. 
68). Nkrumah had made a call for Africa’s political unity in order to 
bring forth the African political kingdom. Through argumentation, he 
had created in his audience “a disposition to act” (Perelman, 1982, p. 
12).  
The speech ends with “Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands 
unto God.” Though it is a reference to Psalm 68 verse 31, it is 
particularly an invocation of Marcus Garvey’s call for the United 
States of Africa (www.black-king.net). It is a call for Africans to 
reclaim their past glory. In a rhetorical sense, Nkrumah had tapped into 
the social knowledge of the audience. I borrow from Murphy (1997) 
when he says that, “rhetorical traditions organise the ‘social 
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knowledge’ of communities and make available symbolic resources 
for the invention of arguments aimed at authoritative public 
judgments” (p. 72). By ending the address with Garvey’s words, 
Nkrumah had partly invented his authority by appropriating unto 
himself the authority of Garvey and other Pan Africanists in whose 
tradition he operated. Murphy further notes that “invention as 
orchestration views rhetorical creativity as an effort to engage other 
voices and illuminate our circumstance by bringing their wisdom to 
bear” (p. 74). Through identification, Nkrumah had “reinforced 
commonality between [himself] and audience” (Endres, 2011, p. 6) 
and had to invoke the noble ideals cherished and shared by the 
forebears of Pan-Africanism. In terms of Nkrumah’s rhetorical 
invention, invoking the authority of Garvey has not constituted his 
only proof, but had rounded off a well-developed argumentation 
(Perelman & Olbrechts -Tyteca, 1969). The speech ends with a call to 
the audience to fulfil the historical mandate of African liberation in 
Ethiopia, the spiritual land of African emancipation. 
 
Limitations of the Address 
A rhetorical speech is summoned into existence by a rhetorical 
situation. Without a situation, there cannot be a rhetorical speech 
(Bitzer, 1968). Bitzer notes three essential features of every rhetorical 
situation. These are the rhetorical exigency, rhetorical audience and 
constraints (pp. 6-8). He defines rhetorical exigency as any 
“imperfection marked by urgency” which needs to be addressed by 
discourse within a situation (p. 6-8). In Addis Ababa, the dominant 
exigency was essentially the urgent need for a continental political 
unity.  Rhetorical audience, as explained earlier, “consists only of 
those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and 
being mediators of change” (p. 7).  
Since the delegates which were present in Addis Ababa were 
voting delegates and therefore possessed the mandate to bring African 
political unity into reality, they can be appropriately regarded as a 
rhetorical audience in view of Bitzer’s explanation. Bitzer concludes 
that rhetorical situations comprise a number of “constraints made up 
of persons, events, objects and relations” that form part and parcel of 
the rhetorical situation since “they have the power to constrain 
decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (p. 8). Several 
constraints confronted Nkrumah within the rhetorical situation at the 
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Addis Ababa conference. An attempt will be made to examine some 
key constraints which confronted Nkrumah’s address. 
In Addis Ababa, it became absolutely clear that Nkrumah did 
not fully understand the complexity of the rhetorical situation. Before 
attending the conference, Nkrumah had, in the words of Scott 
Thompson (1969), “a most imprecise view of the African situation” 
(p. 319). He could not analyse therefore critically the challenges which 
the situation presented to his address. Nkrumah had never spoken at a 
conference with such a high number of African heads of states in 
attendance (Thompson, 1969, p. 312) and it was never going to happen 
after the Addis Ababa’s experience. At the conference, the dynamics 
were different in terms of the audience’s position in relation to 
Nkrumah. He had had past experiences of speaking on behalf of Africa 
at the United Nations and other international platforms where the 
audience were predominantly Western leaders. Whenever he had 
spoken to Africans in Africa, the audience had taken inspiration from 
him. This was partly because most of them still laboured under 
colonialism in their own countries and needed a sense of direction. 
However, this time, quite a number of these African leaders had 
travelled to Addis Ababa as leaders of their newly independent 
countries. In terms of structure, Nkrumah had found himself in what 
Bitzer (1969) refers to as a complex and a less structured rhetorical 
situation (Bitzer, 1969, pp. 11-12). It was not going to be an easy task 
connecting all the different constraints to achieve the most appropriate 
rhetorical effect within the given situation. In other words, such a 
given situation as presented to Nkrumah in Addis Ababa, will pose 
tremendous challenges to the most experienced rhetor. I will try to 
examine the rhetorical constraints, their complexity and their relation 
to the rhetorical audience and how they affected the audience’s 
response to Nkrumah’s address. 
Roughly three years preceding the Addis Ababa conference, a 
number of events were working to shape what was going to unveil later 
at the conference. Perhaps, the outcomes of these events, with 
Nkrumah as a major actor, were going to serve as major constraints to 
Nkrumah’s rhetoric at the conference.  Perelman and Olbrects –Tyteca 
(1969) argue “that the speaker’s life, insofar as it is public, forms a 
long prelude to his speech” (p. 320). This was just the case for 
Nkrumah at Addis Ababa.  
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One of the major constraints to Nkrumah’s rhetoric had to do 
with questions with regard to his personal credibility among the 
audience. Rooney (2007) reports that Nkrumah had a number of 
unresolved conflicts with his neighbours within West Africa. The first 
related to issues on territorial dispute(s) with Ghana’s immediate 
neighbours, Ivory Coast, led by Houphouet-Boigny and Togo, under 
the leadership of Sylvester Olympio. These unfortunate developments, 
Rooney argues, led the Togolese leader in “reject[ing] Nkrumah’s 
views on African unity and quickly turned to the francophone states 
for allies” (p. 282).  
Beyond these conflicts, there were reports of strong 
antagonism of Nkrumah towards Nigeria, to the extent that Nkrumah 
had broken away from a joint airline board between Ghana and Nigeria 
which had been inherited from the British colonial administration. 
Nigeria had seen the common airline as a source of a viable economic 
co-operation between two neighbours in West Africa (Rooney, 2007). 
To a large extent, Nkrumah had, perhaps, lost his trust and credibility 
when it came to co-operation even within the sub region of West 
Africa. He had lost the confidence and trust of three strategic leaders 
who should have been his immediate source of support in Africa. 
These three leaders should have formed part of a crucial supporting 
audience for him in Addis Ababa.  Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the 
Prime Minister of Nigeria, was a leading voice at the time within the 
Moderate group of countries; he had emerged as an African statesman 
and also represented a strong voice for African unity. Ivory Coast and 
Togo were important constituencies within the French group in West 
Africa. Losing the Nigerian and two other sub-regional leaders was 
going to haunt Nkrumah at Addis Ababa. Certainly, these situations 
represented obvious constraints in Addis Ababa for Nkrumah. 
Aristotle (2007) asserts that “character is almost, so to speak, the most 
authoritative form of persuasion” (p. 39 [1356a]) but Nkrumah had, at 
this point, lost this quintessential element in his rhetoric. 
Connected to Nkrumah’s antagonism of some West African 
leaders, was also a second constraint. He overtly and constantly 
criticised the regional groupings: the Union Afrique et Malgache and 
the East African Federation. His criticisms naturally attracted strong 
opposition to his ideas from members of these groupings, especially 
from Julius Nyerere (Thompson, 1969) who seemed to have become a 
strong force in the East African liberation movement. Nkrumah’s 
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criticism of these groups is made obvious even in Addis Ababa. With 
his biting rhetoric, Nkrumah had further deepened the apparent crack 
which only needed time to cave in. The right moment was at Addis 
Ababa. In as much as Nkrumah seemed oblivious of the extent of the 
animosity he had already generated towards himself and his rhetoric, 
his invention at the conference further deteriorated the already 
precarious situation. Bitzer (1968) further observed that the speaker’s 
invention to address given constraints within a rhetorical situation can 
bring into the situation “additional important constraints” such as “his 
logical proof, and style” (p. 8). Perhaps, if Nkrumah were aware of the 
simmering antagonism towards his rhetoric, he probably should have 
modified his rhetorical posture. If he were truly aware, then it was 
quite suicidal for him to have entirely ignored such pertinent concerns. 
It seems surprising however, knowing who Nkrumah was, at least, in 
terms of rhetoric, to have totally avoided a defence of his personal 
integrity in his address if he had really been on top of issues concern 
his audience perception about himself. 
Another constraint connected to Nkrumah’s deteriorated 
credibility even before Addis Ababa was the accusations of subversive 
activities in which he was implicated. Fingers pointed at Nkrumah 
with assassination attempts on both Sylvester Olympio (Rooney, 
2007) and Houphouet-Boigny (Thompson, 1969). The worst 
accusation of Nkrumah was the assassination of President Olympio on 
the 13th January 1963, just three months before the Addis Ababa 
conference. He needed to extricate himself convincingly from these 
accusations but this never happened. If he did, it was not forceful 
enough to silence the overwhelmingly negative publicity which was 
all over in Africa. Some rhetorical situations can mature and decay 
over time (Bitzer, 1969) but this was not the case. Especially with the 
Addis Ababa conference around the corner, the situation was gradually 
building momentum, waiting for an appropriate response in Addis 
Ababa (Bitzer, 1969).   
At a conference in Lagos, the Moderate group publicly 
accused Nkrumah of the assassination (Thompson, 1969). As a result 
of bad blood towards Nkrumah, Guinea went further to declare the late 
Olympio as a hero (Thompson, 1969). Thompson (1969) reports that, 
“a revulsion against Nkrumah spread across Africa, at a critical time 
for Ghanaian diplomacy” (p. 311). These incidents, to a large extent, 
deeply and permanently affected Nkrumah’s credibility even after 
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1963. In the meantime, they presented an insurmountable constraint 
for Nkrumah to negotiate. In effect, in the eyes of the audience in 
Addis Ababa, Nkrumah had no credibility. They had an entirely 
different perception about him.  
Moreover, the Congo crises became another source of 
constraint for Nkrumah. Nkrumah had demonstrated an unflinching 
support for Patrice Lumumba. The Congo crisis had brought divisions 
amongst countries in the Central Africa region. The division was 
marked by those who were on the sides of Lumumba and those who 
supported Kasavubu (Rooney, 2007). Arguably, Nkrumah provided 
the strongest voice of defence for Lumumba both within and outside 
Africa. Nkrumah’s rhetoric and actions in the Congo crises naturally 
attracted the enemies of Lumumba towards him. At this moment, he 
had lost important rhetorical audiences in almost every part of Africa. 
It becomes apparent therefore that Nkrumah had very few loyal 
supporters just before the Addis Ababa conference. In argumentation, 
it is the audience that have the ultimate power to judge the speaker’s 
discourse (Farell, 1993). This would be daunting when the speaker is 
bound to face seemingly opposing rhetorical audience such as was 
going to be present at Addis Ababa. To a large extent, Nkrumah’s 
rhetoric at the Conference never had a good chance to thrive in view 
of the constraints which loomed ominously ahead of his invention.  
Lastly, the new African leaders whose country had just 
emerged from colonial rule were not ready for African political unity 
for politically obvious reasons. By 1963, thirty-two African countries 
were independent in Africa. As many as twenty-three of these 
countries had emerged out of colonial rule within a space of three years 
before the Addis Ababa conference. For most of these leaders, it was 
politically untenable to relinquish their new found political authority 
just after their independence to a single united political government of 
Africa. So far, as these new leaders were concern, Nkrumah’s 
rhetorical position seemed overly ambitious. While Nkrumah pressed 
on for African political unity, his invention, perhaps, began to generate 
an internal argument within this new breed of African leaders. 
Perelman and Olbrechts –Tyteca (1969) give insight about a kind of 
argumentation that ensues whilst the speaker argues. They explain:  
While the speaker is arguing, the hearer in turn tends to argue 
on his own account about the speech in order to take his own stand, to 
determine the credibility he ought to attach to it. The hearer who listens 
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to the arguments not only understands them in his own way, but also 
creates new arguments of his own, which are usually unexpressed but 
which nevertheless intervene to modify the final results of the 
argumentation (p. 189).  
If such a situation was the case, then the new African leaders 
rationalised their own political situations in the light of Nkrumah’s 
deliberative proposal. Faced with the difficult sacrifice they would 
certainly have to make, most, if not all, of them might refrain from 
given their accent to the thesis which has been “presented for their 
consent” (Perelman, 1982, p. 9). In effect, as new leaders, they were 
being summoned, as it were, by Nkrumah to sacrifice their political 
interest on the altar of African unity. This, certainly, seemed a huge 
price for any new leader to be called upon to pay given the 
circumstances.  
At the end of the conference, most of the proposals that were 
put forward by Nkrumah were unanimously voted down by the 
delegates (Rooney, 2007). Nkrumah’s main proposal of an immediate 
continental political unity was postponed for discussion at the next 
OAU conference which was to occur two years later in Accra. His plea 
for at least, a more effective form of unity only gained the support of 
President Obote from Uganda and Youlou from Congo Brazzaville 
(Poe, 2003). This was not unexpected, in the light of the enumerated 
constraints above. Nkrumah’s invention had been eclipsed by 
constraints born out of his own actions and inactions as a political 
actor. His dream of continental unity had been deferred. Perhaps, this 
was going to be forever. African unity was finally given birth to in 
Addis Ababa, but never in the total sense of Nkrumah’s rhetorical 
imagination. Though its formation did not reflect Nkrumah’s vision in 
its entirety, the long deliberation on African unity had been and would 
continue to be, to a great extent, shaped by Nkrumah’s rhetorical 
invention.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate some ways through which 
major rhetorical constraints can inhibit a successful rhetorical 
performance and also, how effectively a rhetor can deploy the relevant 
tools in addressing a composite audience. Though, a look at 
Nkrumah’s speech, independent of the context provided by Addis 
Ababa, reveals the qualities of a great speech, yet, the potency of the 
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constraints inherent in the situation undoubtedly minimized largely the 
cumulative effect of his rhetorical performance. Therefore, the success 
of any good speech cannot be independent of the situation (Bitzer, 
1968) within which a rhetoric transaction occurs. Rhetors’ 
understanding of nuances of a situation is quintessential for a 
successful rhetorical transaction. 
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